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ABSTRACT
Less is known about social welfare objectives when it is costly to change
prices, as in Rotemberg (1982), compared with Calvo-type models.
We derive a quadratic approximate welfare function around a distorted
steady state for the costly price adjustment model. We highlight the
similarities and differences to the Calvo setup. Both models imply
inflation and output stabilization goals. It is explained why the degree
of distortion in the economy influences inflation aversion in the
Rotemberg framework in a way that differs from the Calvo setup.
JEL Classification: E52, E61, E63.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models incorporating sticky
prices often adopt the Calvo (1983) device that each period rms face a constant
probability of being able to reset price. The resulting frameworks popularity
is partly explained by nice features of its linear-quadratic approximation.
In particular, the rst-order approximation to rms price setting behavior
implies a Phillips relation with fairly sharp empirical implications for the
equilibrium relationship between output and ination. Moreover, the second-order
approximation to the social welfare function provides a rigorous justication for
a focus predominantly on ination in the conduct of monetary policy.1
An alternative approach is developed in Rotemberg (1982) based on the
simple idea that changing prices is costly. This approach is related to the sS
literature. But as the cost of price adjustment grows in the square of price
changes, Rotembergs approach is simpler and somewhat easier to incorporate
in DSGE models.
A key feature of the Rotemberg model is that all rms change prices in unison;
there is no price dispersion as in Calvos approach. That makes for algebraic
simplicity but also implies that the costs of ination are somewhat di¤erent
across the two models. In particular, ination is generally much more costly in
Calvos framework. For example, Damjanovic and Nolan (2008, 2010) compare the
seigniorage-maximizing ination rates (SMIRs) across models and nd that the
Rotemberg-based SMIR is generally in double digits and close to the exible price
SMIR . Under Calvo the SMIR is in single gures and perhaps as low as 2  3%.
That is because price dispersion distorts substantially labour supply and demand
decisions in Calvos model. In Rotembergs model ination predominantly a¤ects
1Benigno and Woodford (2005) is a detailed analysis of the framework to which we refer.
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the economy through the direct cost of price adjustment.2
The di¤ering impact of ination across models raises the issue of how
(monetary) policy objectives might di¤er between frameworks. This paper shows
that, in fact, the linear-quadratic approximation to a baseline Rotemberg model
around a distorted, zero-ination steady state is almost equivalent to the Calvo
model. In particular, the second-order approximation to social welfare has the
same form and, more surprisingly, very similar coe¢ cients attached to inationary
and output gaps as in the Calvo model. However, in the Rotemberg model the
social weight on ination objectives is more sensitive to the degree of ine¢ ciency
in the economy because agents ultimately endogenize some important costs of
ination that agents in the Calvo model cannot.
Section 2 sets out agentsdecisions and Section 3 looks at rmsdecisions.
In Section 4 a Ramsey problem is constructed to characterize the optimal steady
state around which the approximations will take place. Section 5 describes the
second-order approximation (additional manipulations are in the appendix) and
describes our key results.
2. Agents decisions
There are a large number of identical agents in the economy who evaluate utility
with the following criterion:
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Ct; Nt) = E0
1X
t=0
t

log(Ct)  
1 + v
N1+vt

: (2.1)
Et denotes the expectations operator at time t,  is the discount factor, Ct is
consumption and Nt is the quantity of labour supplied, v  0 measures labour
supply elasticity while  is a preferenceparameter. Consumption is dened over a
2Ascari and Rossi (2008) compare these two models and nd that they behave di¤erently
with trend ination.
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basket of goods of measure one and indexed by i, Ct =
hR 1
0
ct(i)
 1
 di
i 
 1
: The price-
level, Pt, is Pt =
hR 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
i 1
1 
: The demand for each good is Yt(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 
Y dt ;
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the nal good produced in industry i and Y dt
denotes aggregate demand.
Agents face the ow budget constraint
Ct +Bt =
[1 + it 1]
t
Bt 1 + wtNt +t: (2.2)
As all agents are identical, the only nancial assets traded will be government
bonds. Here Bt denotes the nominal value at the end of date t of government
bond holdings, 1 + it is the nominal interest rate on this risklessbond, wt is
the real wage, and t is remitted prots. Agents maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2).
Necessary conditions for an optimum include the labour supply function (2.3) and
the consumption Euler equation, (2.4):
Nvt Ct = wt; (2.3)
Et


Ct
Ct+1
1
t+1

=
1
1 + it
: (2.4)
3. Firms decisions
Labour is the only factor of production. Firms are monopolistic competitors who
produce their distinctive goods according to the following technology
Yt(i) = AtNt(i)
1=; (3.1)
where Nt(i) denotes labour hired by rm i and At is a productivity shifter. There
are diminishing returns to labour,  > 1. The demand for output determines the
demand for labour, so
Nt(i) =

Yt(i)
At

=

Pt(i)
Pt
 
Yt
At

: (3.2)
Following Rotemberg (1982), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Bouakez et
al. (2009), it is costly for rms to change prices:
Price adjustment cost =

2

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1
2
;
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where  > 0 is a measure of price stickiness.
The rm sets its price to maximize the net present value of future prots:
maxEt
1X
k=0
dt;t+k
 
Yt+k

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
1 
  t+kwt+k(i)Nt+k(i) 

2

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k 1(i)
  1
2!
:
Here dt;t+k := t+k (Ct=Ct+k)and t+krepresents cost-push factors (including labour
taxation, perhaps). The rst-order condition with respect to Pt(i)Pt is derived and,
since all rms charge the same price, in equilibrium Pt(i)Pt = 1: The Phillips relation
is readily derived:
(   1)Yt   twtA t Y t + t (t   1) = Et
Ct
Ct+1
t+1 (t+1   1) : (3.3)
Absent relative price distortions, the average wage is
wt = Ct

Yt
At
v
: (3.4)
The costs of price adjustment a¤ect consumers by reducing prot share.
Consequently, the household budget constraint implies the market clearing
condition
Ct = Yt   
2
(t   1)2 : (3.5)
4. Optimal steady state
4.1. Ramsey problem
To approximate the model one chooses an appropriate point for the approximation.
The rst step is to formulate a Ramsey problem. Hence,
maxE0
1X
t=0
t

log(Ct)  
1 + v
 
A 1t Yt
(v+1)
; (4.1)
subject to market clearing (3.5) and pricing behavior (4.2)
(   1)Yt   tCt
 
A 1t Yt
(v+1)
+ t (t   1) = Et Ct
Ct+1
t+1 (t+1   1) : (4.2)
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Next, one solves this problem assuming commitment; we adopt the "timeless
perspective" of Benigno and Woodford (2005). Thus, optimal policy under
commitment implies zero ination. From (3.5) one nds
C = Y (4.3)
and, using (3.3) and (3.4), that the optimal level of steady state output is
Y (v+1) =
   1

: (4.4)
5. Second-order approximation
One now constructs the second-order approximation to social welfare which
coincides with the objectives of the representative individual. Thus,
U = E0
1X
t=0
t

log(Ct)  
1 + v
 
A 1t Yt
(v+1)
= E0
1X
t=0
t
 bCt      1

bYt   bAt  1
2
(   1) (1 + v)

bYt   bAt2+O3: (5.1)
O3 indicates terms of third and higher order. The second-order approximation to
market clearing, (3.5), is bYt = bCt + 
2Y
b2t +O3: (5.2)
Combining (5.1) and (5.2) one obtains
U = E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt   bAt
  
2Y
1X
t=0
tb2t   12 (1  ) (1 + v)
1X
t=0
T
bYt   bAt2 +O3 + tip; (5.3)
where  := 1    1

1

is a constant which sums up all the distortions in the
economy3. Finally, one derives a second-order approximation to price setting
3tip denotes terms independent of policy. Broadly speaking, it collects terms that are not
functions of policy. See Woodford (2003).
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behavior (equation (6.1) in the appendix). That delivers an expression for the
second-order approximation to social welfare in terms of output and ination:
U =  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt   bAt + 
(v + 1)
bt2
 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

(1 + v)Y
b2t  (1 + v) + 1

+O3 + tip: (5.4)
Note, the Phillips curve (derived in the appendix) takes the same form in both
the Calvo and Rotemberg specications; all that di¤ers is the  parameter4:
 1i
bYt   bAt = bt   Etbt+1 + et +O2; i = R;C (5.5)
where R =

( 1)Y (v + 1) denotes the slope of the Rotemberg Phillips Curve
5
and where C =
(1 )(1 )

(1+v)
((1+v) +1) is the slope of the Calvo Phillips Curve.
The Rotemberg social objective (5.4) is
UR =  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
ty2t  
1
2
R


(1 + v)
+ 1

(   1)E0
1X
t=0
tb2t +O3 + tip; (5.6)
where yt :=
bYt   bAt + (v+1)bt. Now one can compare this with the Calvo
version6:
UC =  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
ty2t  
1
2
CE0
1X
t=0
tb2t +O3 + tip:
The Rotemberg model delivers a very similar objective function to the Calvo
model. First, optimal policy tries to minimize ination and output gaps.
Furthermore, and more surprisingly, the coe¢ cient on the ination term in UR
is close to (1=2)C , assuming, via normalization of , that the slopes of the
Phillips curves are identical. Indeed, for a realistic parameterization, the ratio of
the weights on ination across loss functions is equal to unity plus or minus 20%,
4See equation (30) in Benigno and Woodford (2005).
5For convenience, et := bt(1+v)
6UC corresponds to equation (32) in Benigno and Woodford (2005). Our formulation is
simpler because we have fewer sources of uncertainty; we only include productivity and cost-
push shocks.
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approximately. However, observe that in the Rotemberg social welfare function
the weight on ination increases in the ine¢ ciency of the economy; the larger
the distortions, the larger the cost of ination uctuations. In contrast, in the
Calvo set-up it is only the degree of competition, , that a¤ects the ination
weight7. Why? In the Rotemberg model there is a wedge between output and
consumption that is proportional to the square of ination, see (3.5). However, in
the Calvo model that wedge is absent and the principle distortions are included
in the Phillips curve. Finally, by setting  = 0 one can compare objectives in the
non-distorted steady state case. Again, assuming C = R; the ination weights
di¤er only marginally; (1=2)C compared with (1=2) (   1)R8:
5.1. Concluding remarks
The Rotemberg approximate social welfare function is very similar to the Calvo
models if linearized around a zero ination steady state both in terms of functional
form and coe¢ cients. However, the degree of distortion in the economy inuences
ination aversion in Rotembergs framework in a way that has no counterpart in
Calvos setup. Finally, we emphasize that these two model economies behave very
di¤erently under trend ination (see Damjanovic and Nolan (2008)).
7Had we used CRRA utility,  would have appeared in UC also.
8 usually takes values between 7 and 10 in applied work.
8
References
[1] Ascari, Guido and Lorenza Rossi, 2008. "Long-run Phillips Curve and
Disination Dynamics: Calvo vs. Rotemberg Price Setting," DISCE -
Quaderni dellIstituto di Economia e Finanza ief0082, Università Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
[2] Benigno, Pierpaolo & Michael Woodford, 2005. "Ination Stabilization And
Welfare: The Case Of A Distorted Steady State," Journal of the European
Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1185-1236, December.
[3] Bouakez, Hafedh, Emanuela Cardia and Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2009.
"The Transmission Of Monetary Policy In A Multisector Economy",
International Economic Review, vol. 50(4), pages 1243-1266, November.
[4] Calvo, Guillermo. (1983). "Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing
Framework." Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-98.
[5] Damjanovic, Tatiana & Charles Nolan, 2008. "Seigniorage-maximizing
ination," CDMA Working Paper Series 0807, Centre for Dynamic
Macroeconomic Analysis.
[6] Damjanovic, Tatiana & Charles Nolan, 2010. "Seigniorage-maximizing
ination under sticky prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 503-519.
[7] Damjanovic, Tatiana & Charles Nolan, forthcoming. "Relative Price
Distortions and Ination Persistence," Economic Journal.
[8] Rotemberg, Julio. J. (1982), "Sticky Prices in the United States", Journal of
Political Economy, 90, pp. 1187-1211.
9
[9] Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Martin Uribe (2004), "Optimal Fiscal and
Monetary Policy under Sticky Prices", Journal of Economic Theory 114
(February 2004), pp. 198-230.
[10] Woodford, Michael, (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press.
6. Appendix: derivation of (5.4)
The price setting relation (4.2) is approximated as
bYt   bTt + 
(   1)Y bt   (   1)Y Etbt+1 + (6.1)
1
2
bY 2t   bT 2t + 32 (   1)Y  b2t   b2t+1  (   1)Y  bCt   bCt+1 bt+1 = O3:
Here Tt stands for total production costs satisfying the identity
bTt = bt + bCt + (v + 1)bYt   bAt : (6.2)
Hence, the rst order approximation to (4.2) is familiar

(   1)Y (bt   Etbt+1) = (v + 1)bYt   bAt+ bt +O2 (6.3)
One may integrate forward (6.1) yielding
E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt   bTt+ 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t
bY 2t   bT 2t  =

(   1)Y E0
1X
t=0
t
 bCt   bCt+1 bt+1 + tip+O3:
Combining this with (5.2) and (6.2) obtains
E0
1X
t=0
t(v + 1)
bYt   bAt+ tip+O3 =
  E0
1X
t=0
t

2Y
b2t   (   1)Y E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt   bYt+1 bt+1
  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t
hbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti h2bYt + bt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti :
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(6.4)
Now, multiplying both sides of (6.3) by bYt, yieldshbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti bYt = (   1)Y bt bYt   Etbt+1 bYt+O3;
which solved forward gives
1X
t=0
t


(   1)Y bt   bt + (v + 1)bYt   bAt
 bYt =

(   1)Y
1X
t=0
tEtbt+1 bYt + tip+O3:
That expression, in turn, is rewritten as

(   1)Y
1X
t=0
tEtbt+1 bYt   bYt+1 = (6.5)
 
1X
t=0
t
hbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti bYt + tip+O3:
Combining (6.5) with (6.4) results in
1X
t=0
t(v + 1)
bYt   bAt =
 
1X
t=0
t

2Y
b2t   1X
t=0
t
hbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti bYt
  1
2
1X
t=0
t
hbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti h2bYt + bt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti+ tip+O3;
which can be simplied as
1X
t=0
t(v+1)
bYt   bAt =   1X
t=0
t

2Y
b2t 12
1X
t=0
t
hbt + (v + 1)bYt   bAti2+tip+O3: (6.7)
The expression for welfare reported as expression (5.6) is obtained by combining
(6.7) with (5.3).
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